Hypatia--"New Mestizas," "'World'-Travelers," and "Dasein": Phenomenology and the Multi-Voiced, Multi-Cultural Self

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The aim of this essay is to carry out an analysis of the multi-voiced, multi-cultural self discussed by Latina feminists in light of a Heideggerian phenomenological account of persons or "Existential Analytic." In so doing, it (a) points out similarities as well as differences between the Heideggerian description of the self and Latina feminists' phenomenological accounts of self, and (b) critically assesses Mar'a Lugones's important notion of "world-traveling." In the end, the essay defends the view of a "multiplicitous" self which takes insights from Lugones's view of the self that "travels 'worlds'" and from other Latina feminists' accounts of self as well as from Martin Heidegger's account of Dasein.

Voy,
vengo,
y luego pienso.

Que lo mismo
aquí que allá
no hay
un lugar
conseguido. Que aquí
como allá
soy lo que
las gentes Ilaman
un extranjero.

Y como un extranjero
iré y vendré.
Hasta que aquí
como allá
ni yo
ni nadie lo sea.

Through traveling to other people's "worlds" we discover that there are "worlds" in which those who are the victims of arrogant perception are really subjects, lively beings, resistors, constructors of visions, even though in the mainstream construction they are animated only by the arrogant perceiver and are pliable, foldable, file-awayable, classifiable.

In her revolutionary text, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (1987, 77), Gloria Anzaldúa writes,

Because I, a mestiza, continually walk out of one culture
and into another,
because I am in all cultures at the same time,
alma entre dos mundos, tres, cuatro,
me zumba la cabeza con lo contradictorio.
Estoy norteada por todas las voces que me hablan
Simultaneamente.

In this poem, Anzaldúa is referring to the human being who is caught in between cultures or "worlds," the being who is finally being recognized and discussed by some literary critics, sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers.¹ This is the being whose life is "on-the-hyphen," who inhabits "borderlands" or "nepantla"² (Mora 1993, 5), who goes by the name of "the new mestiza" (Anzaldúa 1987, 77), and who is said to suffer from "cultural schizophrenia" (Gaspar de Alba 1995, 106) and "psychic restlessness" (Anzaldúa 1987, 78)--after all, it is not so easy to live in between worlds or in the margins.

In the following essay, I would like to provide an analysis of some important features of this multi-voiced, multi-cultural being or "world"-traveler (Lugones 1989, 275) described by Latina feminists, specifically features concerning this being's selfhood, in light of Heideggerian phenomenology. In so doing, I point out similarities and differences between these feminists' accounts of a multi-cultural self and the Heideggerian view of self. I also critically assess María Lugones's important notion of "'world'-traveling." Lastly, I offer an account of a multiplicitous self which captures insights from Lugones's view of the "world"-traveler and from other Latina feminists' accounts of self as well as from Martin Heidegger's view of Dasein. ³

But why look at the accounts of multi-cultural selves or "world"-travelers with phenomenological glasses on? The aim of so-called phenomenological theories is to close the gap, or at least to attempt to close the gap, between theory and practice, between how we think of the world and how we live it. The Heideggerian account of persons, or Dasein as beings-in-the-world who can never doubt the existence of other minds or of external objects, is supposed to capture us in our "everydayness" (1962, 38). Thus, Heideggerian existential phenomenology, construed as an attempt to explain the ontological characteristics of human beings, is taken as doing justice to our experience due to the fact that it has to be confirmed by the "ontic," by facts about us and our world. ⁴

Writers such as Gloria Anzaldúa (1987), Cherríe Moraga (1981, 1983), Norma Alarcón (1996, 1997), Chéla Sandoval (1995, 1998) and María Lugones (1989, 1992, 1996), now called "U.S. Third-World Feminists,"⁵ are also providing theories that are informed by experience. The power and seductiveness of their accounts derives from the fact that they are discussing their lives, not the life of an abstract, imaginary, transcendental subject who is removed from a specific historical context and who exists in the minds of some philosophers or in some platonic heaven. They are discussing the lives of those condemned to live the life of the "world"-traveler.⁶ Given the Heideggerian commitment to our everyday existence, as well as other features of the "Existential Analytic," I find the account of Dasein as being-in-the-world helpful in explaining the self described by these theorists who are providing phenomenological accounts of "world"-travelers. As we will see, to be a "world"-traveler is in some way similar to being in the world in the way Heidegger describes--and to be Dasein can be seen as being able to be-in-worlds, to travel-"worlds"as Lugones suggests.

Even though the Heideggerian account and those provided by Latina feminists originate in widely different social, political, and economic situations, and arise from different needs--to do ontology in Heidegger's case and to raise awareness of marginalized groups in Latina feminists' case--both types of accounts are important for the development of a notion of self which attempts to do justice to our experience, which takes into consideration the various contexts that contribute to making us who we are.⁷

I. The "World"-Traveler Self

Traditional accounts of subjectivity rely on the alleged primacy of reason and what Charles Taylor (1989, 111) calls a move towards "inwardness." Thus we talk about the modern self, the ego cogito, who has a relationship to the world in terms of ideas or representations and who thus ends up trapped in its own mind. This highly respected subject,⁸ however, has come under such intense attack by various camps that many are in the process of digging its grave and others consider it dead and even forgotten.⁹ Although still a matter of controversy, we can say that the podium from which the unified, epistemic subject presided has been vacated (see Fox-Genovese 1988, 67). Lourdes Torres, in her essay "The Construction of Self in U.S. Latina Autobiographies" (1991, 274), says that it is Latina authors who are now "seizing the podium" through their biographical accounts and their elaboration of a self that is not "monolithic." I also think that it is time that writers and thinkers who are not part of the mainstream and who have not been previously recognized take the podium, not to replace the traditional conception of the subject with an equally exclusive account, but to help us redefine the conception of subjectivity and selfhood so as to include considerations of gender, race, and class, as well as multicultural concerns.

But let us look at the description of self emerging from the writings of some Latina feminist authors, a self that, following Lugones, I am here calling the "world"-traveler self. As mentioned above, these authors refer to a notion of a self that is not monolithic. Anzaldúa names this new self the "new mestiza" and states that this new mestiza "has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode" (Anzaldúa 1987, 79). As opposed to the unified, primarily epistemic, autonomous subject preferred by many traditional philosophers, the self conceived by writers such as Anzaldúa, Moraga (1983), Aurora Morales and Rosario Morales (1986), Ofelia Schutte (1998), and others is a multiplicitous self caught in between the norms and practices of different cultures, classes, races, or "worlds." According to Anzaldúa, such a self is one who suffers from an "inner war," a "cultural collision," or a "psychic restlessness," juggling beliefs and practices from two, three, and sometimes more cultures, beliefs and norms which in many cases are completely different or even contradictory (1987, 78).

The responses of the "world"-traveler self to this situation vary: they range from rage to despair and from insecurity to flexibility. As Anzaldúa puts it,

This self, then, needs to be ready to deal with ambiguities and contradictions constantly, and its experience of these ambiguities allows it to have a "new consciousness," a "mestiza consciousness," as Anzaldúa calls it (1987, 77), or a "differential consciousness," as Sandoval puts it (1998, 358). According to Sandoval, such a consciousness enables "movement between and among ideological positionings" by serving the role of a clutch in a car, the "mechanism that permits the driver to select, engage, and disengage gears in a system for the transmission of power" (1995, 217-18). This self, then, is never ultimately bound by a specific role but is always in the making--it is a self-in-process. As Alarcón states, "The paradoxes and contradictions between subject positions move the subject to recognize, reorganize, reconstruct, and exploit difference through political resistance and cultural productions in order to reflect the subject-in-process" (1996, 138).¹⁰ It is this idea of the self in the making that takes me to the Heideggerian account of persons as described in the "Existential Analytic" of Dasein.

II. The Self as Being-in-the-World

In Being and Time and other early works, Heidegger claims that human beings do not have a substantial core or a substratum in which properties reside. Yet, he is still committed to a notion of selfhood. Rather than providing an account of self as a substantial core, Heidegger claims that the self must be conceived "existentially" (1962, 365). Just like the "world"-traveler self discussed above, the self proposed by Heidegger is a self in the making.¹¹ As Heidegger states in The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1982),

For Heidegger, Dasein is an active self who is constantly projecting itself upon possibilities.¹²

There are other features of the Heideggerian account of persons that allow us to connect this account with the accounts of "world"-traveler selves discussed above: the rejection of the subject-object dichotomy, the hermeneutic nature of the Heideggerian investigation, and the description of Dasein as a social, historical being. Although providing a detailed, in-depth account of these features is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to offer a brief explanation of them to show important similarities between the "world"-traveler self and the self conceived as Dasein, as being-in-the-world.

As stated above, Heidegger rejects the notion of a substantial core and, instead, believes that a human being is a being-in-the-world that defines itself by its involvement in the world. A very important aspect of this account of Dasein is that given the interrelatedness between human beings and the world (which is here conceived as where Dasein "dwells" rather than a sum or aggregate of objects), there is no longer a divide between subject and object (see 1962, sec. 12 and 13). Heidegger attacks the dichotomy between the subject and object, the inner and the outer, because, in his view, this dichotomy does not accurately explain the human being's way of existing in the world. It is part of an account that mistakenly construes the self as a thinking substance and that leads to the infamous and tiresome problems of the existence of the external world and other minds. Consequently, it is one of Heidegger's main targets in the "Existential Analytic." Dasein, as a being-in-the-world, always has a world and has what Heidegger calls Mitsein, or being-with (see 1962, Sec. 26).¹³ Furthermore, given that Dasein is being-in-the-world, it no longer has a primarily epistemic relationship to the world; it no longer needs to go out to the world in order to capture representations of this world which are then to be put in the "'cabinet' of consciousness" (1962, 87). Rather, being-in-the-world has non-reflective understanding, or know-how (1962, 107).¹⁴

In addition to eliminating the subject-object dichotomy and thus the primacy of reflective understanding, Heidegger's account emphasizes the human being's dependence on sociality. Although Heidegger does not deal explicitly with concrete characteristics of human beings (given that he is describing the ontological characteristics), he describes Dasein as a situated self that has at its disposal concrete possibilities. Such possibilities come from a particular context and may pertain to culture, gender, sex, class, etc. The self as a being-in-the-world cannot have a god's eye view or a view from nowhere. Its understanding not only of itself but of the world is dependent on its particular context. This dependence, or interrelatedness between human life and social context, is evident in Heidegger's claim that Dasein in its everydayness is dominated by das Man (the "they"/the "one"). Das Man is, according to the Heideggerian view, an ontological characteristic of Dasein (1962, 164). Similar to the Kierkegaardian notion of "the public" (Bretall 1946, 258-69), it refers to the anonymity and generality implicit in everyday interaction.¹⁵ It serves as a guide to everyday social interaction in the sense that when we are in this mode we basically follow the norms and practices in our culture or society. For example, when greeting someone, we say "hi," shake hands, kiss, or bow, depending on the accepted norm in our culture. For the most part, according to Heidegger, in our everydayness we simply follow these norms and practices unquestioningly. Using Lugones's terms, in our daily existence, in our interaction with others, we "travel" our world with a certain ease that comes from already having a sense of what we have to do as teachers, friends, lovers, parents, or scholars, or whatever our role or situation is.¹⁶

For Heidegger, not only are humans dependent on their context, but context itself is dependent on us. In other words, there is a hermeneutic or interpretative dimension to our existence; we are always involved in a hermeneutic circle.¹⁷ One way in which Heidegger illustrates this point is by explaining the activity of questioning and pointing out that whenever we ask a question, we are being guided beforehand by the answer (see 1962, sec. 1-4). This does not mean that whenever we ask the question we already know the answer explicitly; if this were the case there would be no point in asking the question. Rather, what Heidegger is explaining is that whenever we are in a position to ask a question--even when we think we have no clue about the answer--we already have an understanding of the context, even if it is only a vague understanding. This hermeneutic nature of existence is, for Heidegger, an unavoidable fact for a being that does not have an essence in the sense of a substantial core but has to define itself by its activity in the world. Dasein as a being-in-the-world, then, is always situated in a particular context, a context that allows it to form interpretations. This context which this self inhabits, however, is not itself fixed; it is also a matter of interpretation, depending on the particular self's experiences. In other words, Dasein might have experiences that lead it to revise its previously held interpretation of itself or of its surroundings. Again, if we consider Lugones's account of "world"-traveling in this Heideggerian context, it can be said that given experiences of "world"-traveling, Dasein might be able to reinterpret its "world."

Finally, an important characteristic of human beings as described in the Heideggerian "Existential Analytic" is the fact that we are historical beings. To say that we are historical beings might not at first glance seem like an interesting or original feature of the Heideggerian account until one understands the special sense of being historical described in the "Existential Analytic." For Heidegger, history is not simply the recording of facts, or historiography.¹⁸ Our being historical does not amount to keeping a record of all the events of our lives, or writing our biographies; rather, it has to do with the fact that our life is a process or a temporal "happening." I am a historical being in virtue of my being a temporal being. Given Heidegger's view of temporality as a phenomenon that involves the interrelatedness of the past, the present, and the future, rather than just a sequence of "nows," what I do in the present is connected to what I have done in the past as well as related to my future.¹⁹ This is the case when considering both my personal history as well as the history that I share with others from my culture.²⁰

Heidegger critiques the Aristotelian account of time as a "sequence of 'nows'" and provides a re-description of "human" time as "the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been" (1962, 374). In other words, time is not such that it is only present "now," and this "now" then no longer exists. Our present involves the past and the future. For example, I am writing an essay on philosophy now because I have always been interested in philosophy and hope to get better at writing and expressing my philosophical ideas in the future. I may also participate in a political rally now, because there is a history of oppression in my country, and I want to do something so that this oppression will not continue in the future. For Heidegger, then, Dasein's being historical involves being temporal in this way; our life is always related to a past (my past as well as my shared past), a past that is not just a list of events that have happened to us but a past in which we have lived these events in such a way that they are constitutive for our present as well as our future.

Thus, as we have seen in this section, the "Existential Analytic" provides a description of human beings in which we are not subjects standing against objects in the world; we are social beings dependent on the norms and practices of our culture; we are capable of re-interpreting our existences as well as these norms and practices; and we are historical, temporal beings who will always have a relationship to our past as well as our future. Importantly, some of these characteristics are features that the Heideggerian phenomenological account of self also shares with the more contemporary accounts provided by Latina feminists.

In addition to being a self in process, a self in the making, the characteristics of being-in-the-world mentioned above--the rejection of the subject-object/inner-outer duality and its interpretive, social, and historical nature--are a crucial part of a "world"-traveler self or a new mestiza self. As Anzaldúa puts it,

Yet another similarity with the Heideggerian account is that this self is a historical being. Consider Anzaldúa's remarks about her relationship with the customs and beliefs as well as the history of her people:

Lugones also emphasizes the importance of shared history. As she states, "one may be at ease because one has a history with others that is shared" (1989, 284). "Being at ease" is Lugones's expression for our feeling comfortable in the contexts that we inhabit. It may have to do with being fluent in the language of that context, understanding the norms and practices of the context, as well as having bonds with others (1989, 284). Being-at-ease in the "world," however, is not a feature of the "world"-traveler self. It is not the feature of the individual who is considered the "alien," the "stranger," by the dominant group and who is no longer fully at ease in his or her own culture and is now in the midst of another culture. It is here that the similarities between the Heideggerian notion of Dasein and the multicultural self, the "world"-traveler or the "new mestiza," cease.

One of the main sources of anguish for this multicultural self is precisely that, unlike Heidegger's Dasein, it does not have a sense of all the norms and practices of the new context which it now inhabits. Thus, it does not relate to the world primarily in terms of know-how, as we have seen that Heidegger claims that we do. It has an understanding of the norms and practices of the context with which it identifies, but not of those which are now making demands on its new existence. For example, in Nicaragua, I followed the norm of eating cake with a spoon. In this country the norm seems to be that one eats cake with a fork. Many times when I was offered a piece of cake and then given a fork, or when I proceeded to get utensils, I was a little taken aback--"which utensil do I take? A spoon or a fork? Why a fork?" All of a sudden, I was no longer relating to the world by means of non-reflective understanding or know-how; I had to start being more reflective about my actions. Moreover, not knowing what I was supposed to do, in this situation as well as many others, made me feel not at ease.

I admit that the above example is very simple, and, to be frank, I don't consider etiquette norms very important, but at the time it was a puzzling experience and I think that what we learn from it is telling. Now, imagine experiences that deal with more important, agonizing, cultural norms than simple use of utensils, such as norms related to our bodies, our sexuality, our educational possibilities, our relationships with others, etc. Of course, some of these norms might already require more reflexivity, but there might be norms and practices, other than use of utensil norms, which originally might not require that we know them explicitly but are significant given the consequences if we don't follow them correctly. If this is the case, the point is that "world"-traveler selves continually live these experiences of uneasiness, even while performing practices that for the dominant group are for the most part customary and readily available, or what Heidegger calls "ready-to-hand" (1962, 98).²¹

We can see, then, that while there are important similarities between the self as "world"-traveler and the self as Dasein--there is also a significant difference, the fact that the former is usually "not at ease."²² Interestingly, however, Lugones claims that it is not good for a self to be completely at ease in its "world," since this "tends to produce people who have no inclination to travel across 'worlds' or have no experience of 'world' traveling" (1989, 284). Despite the differences between Lugones's and Heidegger's accounts of a self's everyday dealings with the "world," there is still a point of intersection between the accounts: Heidegger also believes that being completely or maximally at ease in the "world" is not a positive phenomenon and thus he includes an account of what he calls "resoluteness" or "authenticity" (1962, 304, 352). While Lugones critiques the idea because of her interest in illuminating the importance of the experience of "world"-traveling, Heidegger critiques it because being completely dominated by the mode of das Man leads to a lack of self-understanding and lack of responsibility (1962, 163-68).²³ In the end, I believe that despite differences, features of both accounts can be used to provide an explanation of the experience of a self that constantly has to travel "worlds." But, before explaining my view of self as inspired by the work of Heidegger and Latina feminists, let us analyze the concept of "world"-traveling further.

The self that I have called the "world"-traveler self is not just in one "world." As Lugones says, "One can 'travel' between these worlds and one can inhabit more than one of these 'worlds'" (1989, 282). This self is one that can be-in-worlds. The idea that the self can be-in-worlds might be problematic. Lugones says that the description of her experience as someone who travels worlds and who is thus different people in different worlds is "true to experience" but "ontologically problematic." Lugones states,

It might be problematic because human beings are supposed to share a world, not live each in his or her separate world. Of course, thinkers like both Lugones and Heidegger, and the authors and theorists that I have mentioned here, would simply reject an account which leads to a solipsist self. But we can understand the claim that the self inhabits different "worlds," not as a claim about the ontic numerical identity of the world which we inhabit, but as an ontological claim about the ways of being in which we find ourselves in the spaces that we inhabit. Both you and I might be in the same room of the same building in the same city, but if you are a white U.S.-born citizen and I am a Latin American born in Nicaragua, we will probably have different takes on what we experience in this room, and we will have different takes on our experiences depending on the dominant norms and practices of the particular situation and how we relate to these practices given the contexts which dominate our particular interpretations.²⁴ In this sense, we might be in different "worlds," and most likely I will have to travel to your "world."

Here I am adding an "ontological" dimension to the concept "world." I am following Heidegger's definition of world as "wherein a factical Dasein can be said to live" (1962, 93), rather than the merely ontical account of "world" as the sum or aggregate of all objects. This definition, given the Heideggerian account of being-in-the-world, includes both ontic and ontological elements. I am also following Lugones's account of "world." A "world," according to her, can be "an actual society given its dominant (or non-dominant) culture's description and construction of life," "a construction of a tiny portion of a particular society," an "incomplete visionary nonutopian construction of life," or a "traditional construction of life" (1989, 281-82). All of these descriptions of "world" also involve both ontic and ontological elements. In other words, her account of "world" not only includes specific interpretations of groups of people, actual bodies that inhabit these worlds, but also the ways of being of people who find themselves at the margin or far away from the mainstream, not being at ease, suffering the "arrogant perception" of others, etc. Thus, for Heidegger as well as Lugones, "world" is not to be seen as equivalent to the sum of things that are in the world, but includes the ways in which human beings are in the world.²⁵

Moreover, according to Lugones, "world"-traveling does not only involve the idea of being in different "worlds" but also the idea that a "world"-traveler self is a different person in different "worlds." Lugones states,

For Lugones, there is no underlying "I"; there is no "I" that is the same when I am in the Nicaraguan "world" and when I am in the U.S. American "world." In her view, the use of "I" is noninferential, meaning that when I am making claims such as "I am playful in that world," or "I am not playful in that world," I do not infer that the "I" who is making the observation or making the claim is the same as the "I" about whom the claim is being made, as these experiences are always in the first person. In fact, Lugones states that "The shift from being one person to being a different person is what I call 'travel'" (1989, 283). Such a shift may or may not be conscious, and, as Lugones says, we might not even be aware that we are being different persons in different "worlds." In this view, then, "'I' is identified in some sense as one and in some sense as a plurality" (1989, 285), which, according to Lugones, might be "ontologically problematic" but "truest to the experience of 'outsiders'" (1989, 285).

As an example, Lugones discusses her experience of traveling between the "world" that constructs her as stereotypically Latin and the "world" that constructs her as Latin. Given that being stereotypically Latin and being Latin are different, she concludes that when she animates these conceptions (of being stereotypically Latin or being Latin) she is different persons in these "worlds." She adds that because she can animate both conceptions she is an "ambiguous" being. It is this ambiguity that Lugones finds necessary for the survival of people who are not in the mainstream. The fact that they can recognize both conceptions, in this instance the constructions of being stereotypically Latin and of being Latin, gives them an advantage. As she states,

When discussing the confusion that arises in "world"-traveler selves, Lugones also points out that not only can one entertain conceptions of oneself that differ, as in the case of being stereotypically Latin and being Latin, but also conceptions of oneself that are incompatible, for example, being playful in one "world" but not in another, which is a source of confusion.²⁷ As she states,

Lugones further states that not being playful in a world is not simply a matter of "not being at ease" in that world. So, it is not the case that one can become playful once one feels at ease in this world. She states,

Thus, according to Lugones, if this trait (being-playful) is central to one's character, then the world which does not allow us to be playful needs to be changed and any confusion one has at these moments, when one has incompatible attributes, can be understood by appealing to the fact that we are multiple selves: "I can understand my confusion about whether I am or am not playful by saying that I am both and that I am different persons in different 'worlds' and can remember myself in both as I am in the other. I am a plurality of selves" (1989, 286; emphasis added). For Lugones, then, to understand the confusion described above is to "come to see it as a piece" (1989, 286) with the experience of those who are not in the mainstream.

Given the above description of "world"-traveling, a question arises: why does Lugones conclude that those that are "world"-travelers are "different persons" and not complex selves or what I would call "multiplicitous selves?" Another way of making the same point is by asking why, according to Lugones, does "world"-traveling" become "self-traveling?" Although Lugones's explanation of "world"-traveling certainly captures the experience of those who are not part of the mainstream and who are "world"-travelers--it certainly captures the confusion that one feels in this situation--it does not, in my view, draw the right conclusions. It is not clear why the confusion that I have (or Lugones has) when I discover that I am both playful and unplayful in different "worlds" leads to the claim that I am in fact a "plurality of selves" or "different persons in different 'worlds.'" According to Lugones, for me to understand the confusion is to understand that I am different persons in different "worlds." Yet, I can feel this confusion and understand that I am a complex self or a self that is being pulled in different directions by norms, practices, beliefs, etc. of different "worlds" (the U.S. white world or the Nicaraguan "world," for example).

In fact, this is what I think Anzaldúa means when she says that the new mestiza has a "plural personality" and that she operates in a "pluralistic mode." But while Anzaldúa appeals to her self's plurality and the importance of this plurality in her life and calls herself a "complex, heterogeneous" person (1987, 55), she thinks that the ambiguities and contradictions will not be present forever, and "One day the inner struggle will cease and a true integration take place" (1987, 63).²⁸ Anzaldúa's description of the new mestiza depicts a multiplicitous being that is inspired, as well as torn, by ambiguity and contradiction, inspired to become creative (1987, see chap. 6) or to fight and change the ways of the dominant culture. In many cases, it is the ambiguity that brings forth the perception that she calls "la facultad" as well as the "blocks" or "Coatlicue" states that lead to both states of passivity and activity (1987, see 46-51, 74). In many instances, Anzaldúa insightfully describes this multiplicitous character of her self, as when she describes herself as both male and female (1987, 19), explains the many languages that she speaks (1987, 55), and explains her being Mexican as being "neither eagle nor serpent, but both" (1987, 62).

In my view, appealing to a multiplicity of selves does not have to be the only option when we are explaining the self of "world"-travelers. This appeal leads to more problems than advantages. But before dealing with the problems that arise with this appeal to multiple selves (rather than to a "multiplicitous self"), let's see what the advantages are. First, one of the most important advantages is that this appeal is truly phenomenological; it does justice to the experience of those who have to live in different "worlds" and go back and forth between these worlds. Second, this appeal goes against traditional accounts of subjectivity which boast of an underlying "I" or transcendental subject or a substantial subject, and which have come under serious attack by phenomenologists, poststructuralists, and postmodernists. Thus, two important advantages of the appeal to a multiplicity of selves are the fact that it is phenomenological and the fact that it moves us away from all the possible problems associated with traditional accounts of subjectivity.

Nevertheless, an account of a multiplicitous, complex self is able to retain the advantages mentioned above while also avoiding some of the disadvantages. It can still do justice to the experience of "world"-travelers; that is, it captures the "ontological confusion" that Lugones describes and the "psychic restlessness" that Anzaldúa so vividly writes about. It also avoids positing a transcendental ego or an ego pole or describing the self as a substance. But most importantly, it seems to fare better than the account of multiple selves at handling the common but serious criticism that non-traditional accounts of subjectivity cannot account for identity, agency, or responsibility.

Let's see the force of the criticism. If directed to Lugones's account, which makes the claim that a human being is in fact different people in different "worlds," some obvious questions arise: who are you, then, if you are different people in different "worlds"? How is this different from being just a "bundle of impressions?" (Perry 1975, 162). How do you know that you are different people in the first place? Who is responsible for your actions? Although a complete analysis of the issues raised by these questions is well beyond the scope of this paper, it is still possible to point out how someone committed to Lugones's position might respond.

She could claim, and rightly I believe, that questions such as the above come from the perspective of someone committed to the view that there has to be a "driver" in the seat or a "conductor" guiding all the parts of the person (in this case, all the persons). She might add that the interpretation she is offering, however, problematizes this predilection for the driver/conductor model. The point is precisely to show that if we remain true to our phenomenological experience, then some of us are different people, no matter how philosophically unappealing or controversial this might be. In addition, it could be pointed out that according to Lugones it is still possible to identify oneself, not by way of an underlying "I" (1989, 283) but by recognizing that "that is me there and I am so playful in that 'world.'" As Lugones states, "I identify myself as myself through memory and I retain myself as different in memory" (1989, 285). Thus, there is a seemingly Lockean approach in Lugones's account when she emphasizes the role that memory plays in the analysis of ourselves.

Yet, in my view, the above responses are not completely satisfactory. As explained above, it is with the claim about a multicultural self, or a "world"-traveler, being different people in different "worlds," that I part ways with Lugones.²⁹ Given that she appeals to a multiplicity of selves while at the same time appealing to an "I" (although not an "underlying 'I'"), the question of identity becomes very difficult. While Lugones's strategy is to claim that "I identify myself as myself through memory" and thus to assign a prominent role to memory, she does not say enough about the role of memory in the "world"-traveler. Her account of memory is, in my view, too thin, especially given its importance as the medium through which "I" can identify myself and retain myself (as both playful and unplayful, for example). But if there are more of "me," am I supposed to have multiple sets of memories? Or is it that my memory contains all the memories of all of my experiences while traveling different "worlds"? And just how important is memory in Lugones's account of a "person"? It does not seem likely that she would assign memory as important a role as Locke does (that is, as the main criterion for personhood) given that Locke's view runs into serious problems, such as his neglect of the importance of the body for our identity and the possibility of a person going in and out of existence in the instance of memory loss (Perry 1975, 34-52).³⁰ Given the appeal to a multiplicity of persons, Lugones needs to say more about memory and its role in the conception of personhood or selfhood if her account is not to be weakened by questions concerning identity.

In addition to providing too thin an account of memory, Lugones's account of the "world"-traveler runs into another problem: it is not clear how, given the appeal to a multiplicity of selves, I can identify difference in terms of my attributes (seeing that I am playful in one "world" but not in another, to use her previous example). How does one identify difference in the first place? From what perspective do I see that I am different now but not then, in this "world" but not in the other "world"? It seems to me that in order to identify this difference, I would have to have a sense of "me" in the first place. Lugones recognizes that there has to be a perspective from which I can make a judgment about difference and thus appeals to memory as being that which offers this perspective. As we have seen, her claim is that I identify as well as retain myself as different in memory. Nevertheless, when making such a claim, Lugones is already presupposing a self (and even more than one) and not fully explaining what makes a self a self. Given her appeal to a multiplicity of persons, it seems to me that a more complete explanation of selfhood is necessary. Moreover, if memory alone is the key to answering this criticism, again, more needs to be said about its role in "world"-traveling.³¹

Given the issues above, we will fare better if we can show that our self is complex, multiplicitous, ambiguous, and sometimes even contradictory, and that even though we are multiplicitous, there is still a togetherness to our multiplicity.³² Appealing to this togetherness or continuity does not mean that there is a "driver" or a "conductor" systematically organizing us or that there is a perfectly unified being, as defenders of traditional views of subjectivity would have us believe, but there still needs to be some sense of togetherness about us, as complicated as we might be. Such "togetherness" allows us to have a sense of self and the perspective from which "I" can see that I have different attributes in one "world" as opposed to another "world." Again, to appeal to this sense of togetherness or continuity in us is not to long for the unity that only a transcendental ego could provide or to posit some theory of apperception; it is not to resuscitate the traditional subject but simply to explain how it becomes possible for us to explain the difference that Lugones discusses and that many of us feel when we travel "worlds" in the first place.

Explaining this togetherness or continuity in the multiplicity of a "world"-traveler is a difficult enterprise, but various philosophers have attempted similar projects.³³ I see Heidegger's account of Dasein as making a similar attempt, of moving away from the traditional account of subjectivity and trying to show that each of us is a complicated being in the making but that each still has a self. One way in which we can make a further connection, between the Heideggerian account and the accounts of "world"-travelers discussed here, is by showing how Heideggerian elements can help us explain how a multiplicitous "world"-traveler can still be thought of as a self, even though there is no appeal to a transcendental subject or an ego-pole.³⁴

In my view, we can talk about a "world"-traveler, a multiplicitous being, as having ontological elements which make it possible for it to be a self, that make it possible for there to be a sense of togetherness in the multiplicity. One of these ontological elements is what Heidegger calls "mineness" [Jemeinigkeit] (1962, 68). ³⁵ This ontological feature makes it possible for me to be aware of my own being, not in a reflective way, but in a way in which I have a sense of how I am faring in the world. The sense of how, according to Heidegger, we are aware of our own being is difficult to explain. It is related to the Heideggerian notion of Befindlichkeit, which is quite difficult to translate. In Being and Time (1962, 172) it is translated as "state of mind" (one of the ways in which human beings disclose the world). However, this is not a good translation as it adds an epistemic element, which is precisely what Heidegger is trying to avoid. Befindlichkeit has to do with how we find ourselves in the world, but not in an epistemic way or a psychological way. It has to do with having a sense of the world and how we are in that world, but this is not a matter of explicit reflection or ontic or factual features; it is an ontological feature or a way of being.

Thus, according to Heidegger, a human being, a Dasein, is such that it is aware of its being. While performing any ontic task--let's say that I am a writer and thus follow the norms and practices of writing--I am such that my being is an issue. Although in my everyday experience I may fail to understand myself correctly--I might see myself as a substance rather than as a being in the world (Heidegger 1962, chap. 4)--I am such that my own being is an issue. If I am a "world"-traveler who is dealing with norms and practices or different "worlds," I am still ontologically directed towards or concerned with my being, even while in the midst of ambiguities and contradictions that might arise from my "world"-traveling. Hence, this notion of "mineness" adds a subjective element to this account of the multiplicitous "world"-traveler.

In response to a possible criticism that this ontological notion is akin to the Kantian "I think," there is an enormous difference, given that the Kantian project is one that sets up "epistemic" conditions for the possibility of experience (Allison 1983, 10). The view that I am proposing here does not set itself up to propose such conditions. Instead, it is attempting to explain that there is more to human beings than their epistemic capabilities or their physical characteristics; it tries to bring to light the ontological dimension of our existences. The notion of "mineness" needs to be understood within the context of an ontological account which rejects overly materialistic and epistemic accounts of ourselves, an account which includes our sociality, historicality, and our being already here in a world in which we exist as beings-in-the-world, not epistemic subjects.³⁶

Some might also claim that the above explanation of a multiplicitous self that has "mineness" is too subjective and too Cartesian. In fact, it is Cartesian in so far as it relates to an "I," but it is not Cartesian at all given that the self is not characterized as a mental substance that has a primarily epistemic relation to the world and that is encapsulated in its mind. One of the main points of the Heideggerian account is precisely to attack such a notion of the self, because it does not do justice to our experience as social, situated beings. This is why I think that using the Heideggerian notion of self, along with more contemporary accounts, in order to explain the self of "world"-travelers might prove to be helpful. Considering the Heideggerian phenomenological account of self as well as looking at elements that come from accounts of self by thinkers interested in bringing to light the experience of the "outsiders," the ones at the "margins," might serve to provide a fuller account of the self of these "world"-travelers as well as to enhance our understanding of their experiences.

Although I cannot explain all the issues associated with this appeal to an ontological feature in this paper, I would like at least to leave this idea as a suggestion for further investigation. Taking this route towards the ontological, which I admit is not uncontroversial, may, I believe, leave us in a better position to deal with the common criticisms about identity, agency, and responsibility. As indicated in my account of "mineness" above, this ontological element makes it possible for me to be aware of my being. It is what, in my view, provides the sense of togetherness that explains our selfhood, even when this selfhood has ambiguities and contradictions.³⁷ Once there is a self to be appealed to, even if it is multiplicitous, there is more likelihood that we can answer questions about agency and responsibility and that we can praise, blame, or question someone's action.³⁸

If we hold on to the model of a person being a multiplicity of selves, it is not clear that questions about agency and responsibility could be satisfactorily answered. And while some of these questions presuppose old paradigms of subjectivity, I don't think that all do. Questions about agency and responsibility need to be answered even when we no longer wish to mourn traditional subjectivity. Perhaps one way of thinking about it is that we need to open up a space between the accounts of the traditional subject, or the subject that seems to be preferred by traditional thinkers, and those accounts that move so far away from subjectivity that, in the end, they leave us with our hands tied as far as possibilities for political resistance go.³⁹ In my view, the multiplicitous self, that, following Lugones, I am calling the "world"-traveler self, has elements from the accounts of self by Latina feminists as well as the Heideggerian account of self that make it a good candidate to fill in this space.

As we have seen, while there are differences between the Latina feminists' accounts and the Heideggerian account, there are important similarities. In trying to understand the self of the "world"-traveler, we can use the similarities as well as the differences. For example, given that Lugones's account of the "world"-traveler, as important as it is, is too thin when dealing with questions about identity and memory, we can use some Heideggerian elements to enhance it. Given that the Heideggerian account is not explicit about particular contexts, and about issues of gender, race, class, etc., we can use the Heideggerian ontological and ontic framework and make the ontic concerns more explicit. Given that Heidegger does not write much about ethical and political concerns, we can follow the guidance of Latina as well as other feminists to provide possibilities for resistance as well as solidarity. And we can do this all in the context of a multiplicitous self, one that has ambiguities and contradictions which serve to enhance its experience; a self that is not a mental substance but an active self in the making, which relates to the world and is capable of reinterpreting the world and itself; and a self that is situated in a social and historical milieu.

The account of self discussed here is one of a multiplicitous, complex self, which is sometimes ambiguous and contradictory due to the fact that it has to travel "worlds." Following Lugones's influential account of "world"-traveling, I have called this self the "world"-traveler self. Others call it the "new mestiza." There are different names for this being and there are differences between the accounts. Yet, there is an important similarity: all of these names refer to people who find themselves balancing beliefs, norms, and practices from different cultures or societies or from their own heterogeneous groups--beliefs, norms, and practices which cannot always be balanced or aligned neatly.

These names refer to human beings who, given their position in the margins and their status as "aliens," as "outsiders," are oppressed or invisible, and might be in a state of what Anzaldúa calls "intimate terrorism" (1987, 27).⁴⁰ They are the beings who need to move to what she calls the Coatlicue state, the state of creation which opens up possibilities of resistance and solidarity.⁴¹ They are also beings who are themselves members of the dominant group but are willing to travel "worlds," not as tourists who travel to relax, exoticize, and consume, but as people ready to learn from others and to put themselves at risk in order to take a critical stance against the injustices and oppression suffered by people who, day to day, go on being harassed, abused, or ignored.

The ways of the "world"-traveler, with the inner struggles, contradictions, and ambiguities as well as the moments of clear vision and satisfaction, are ways into which we have fallen and must live as members of groups that are not in the mainstream. They are ways which help us not only to survive as multicultural beings, as U.S. Latinas, but also to open up the space for resistance, radical transformation (Martinez 2000, 77) as well as solidarity, and to create "new grounds for coalition across borders" (Sandoval 1995, 221). And they are ways that can serve as examples to those who share a vision of a "freer society of freer agents" (Bartky 1995, 160) in which there is recognition and respect for our differences as well as our shared views--but such resistance, transformation, and solidarity are not easy tasks and more needs to be said about how it is that the "mestiza consciousness" (Anzaldúa 1987, 77) can help effect change. Obvious questions about the possibility of situated criticism and the possibility of normativity within a pluralist context inhabited by "world"-traveler selves remain to be answered.

Thanks to Ellen Feder, Jonathan Gunderson, Linda Martín Alcoff, Adriana Novoa, Jessica Pfeifer, the John Carroll University Reading Group on Feminist Philosophy and Multiculturalism (Kate Catanese, Pam Mason, Lisa Salamon, Julie Sushystska, and Brenda Wirkus), participants of the April 1999 Eastern SWIP conference in Tampa, and the anonymous reviewers from Hypatia for helpful comments, suggestions, and encouragement.

1. See Chéla Sandoval (1998) for a rich bibliography about texts in various fields and by various thinkers that deal with beings that are "in-between" or in the margins in the U.S. See also Teresa C—rdova (1994), Ana Castillo (1994), Adela De la Torre and Beatríz Pesquera (1993), Leticia Galindo and María Gonzales (1999), Jacqueline Martinez (2000), Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa (1981), and Carla Trujillo (1998). There is a great deal of work being done by other women of color and white feminists that deals with the issues addressed in this essay. In addition to the texts that I refer to in the essay see Bat-Ami Bar On (1993), Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres (1991), Patricia Hill Collins (1991), and Trinh Minh-Ha (1989). Martinez's work is of special interest as she uses Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology and her own experience to deal with issues of identity as well as liberation. See her interesting discussion on the theoretical and methodological implications of her project (Martinez 2000, 75), as well as her chapter on La Conciencia de la Mestiza (2000, chap. 4).

3. I am basing my discussion of Martin Heidegger's account of persons on his "early" work, especially Being and Time (1962).

4. "Ontological" refers to ways of being, whereas "Ontical" refers to entities and facts about entities (Heidegger 1962, sec. 3 and 4). Precisely because the Heideggerian account is phenomenological, it cannot be purely ontological; that is, it cannot be a theory that has nothing to do with the way in which we actually live. As Heidegger puts it, there is a "remarkable relatedness backward and forward" between the ontic and the ontological levels (1962, 28). That is, a solely ontological or a solely ontical account of human beings would not accurately explain Dasein. Yet, according to Heidegger, the ontic has priority in the sense that an ontological account must always be confirmed by the ontic and thus the ontologist cannot provide an ontological explanation of human beings that is detached from their everyday ontic existence. For an interesting discussion about the relationship between the ontic and the ontological see Theodore Kisiel (1993, 424-29).

5. Sandoval uses this label and explains its origin. She explains that the label is to be associated with the "'third' and repressed force that nevertheless constantly rises up through dominant meaning systems, breaking apart two-term or binary divisions of human thought" (1998, 355). Unfortunately, "third-world" is also used in a derogatory way to describe nations that are not as powerful as the U.S., and thus might be seen by some as reinforcing negative stereotypes.

6. I say "condemned" to live a life of "world"-traveling, not because I think that "world"-traveling is inherently a negative experience, but because for some it is the only option, and there are many stressful factors that come in our luggage when we go on these travels, ranging from epistemological considerations to issues about self-understanding (or lack of it) and receptivity (or lack of it) from the "other." Consider Jean-Paul Sartre's claim in his account of existential phenomenology and existentialism that the human being is "condemned to be free" (1957, 23). Who doesn't want to be free? And yet, who is so strong as not to be worried or to feel anxiety over the responsibility that this freedom entails? Being "condemned" to a life of "world-traveling" is similarly a matter of both joy and pain.

7. In this essay I concentrate on the writings of U.S. Latinas and Chicanas due to the great effect that these texts have had on my personal experience as a Latina and due to my interest in relating phenomenological theories to concrete experience, in this instance, the experience of being a Latina in the U.S. I do not bring Latina feminists' accounts and the Heideggerian account of self together with the hope of creating a union between them or to say that Heidegger's and Latina feminists' views are to live happily ever after (I realize that this constitutes a problematic union). Nor do I desire to introduce Heideggerian phenomenology in the context of these Latinas' views in order to displace them--it is not my intention to replace accounts of "the new mestiza" or "'world'-travelers" with the account of Dasein or to say that Latinas' selfhood is always metaphysically tied to the notion of selfhood that I am describing here. Rather, I wish to establish a dialogue between these views so that we may (1) understand the similarities and differences between Latina feminists' views of self and the Heideggerian account of Dasein, (2) use Latina feminists' views of self in the search for a description of a multi-voiced or multi-cultural self, (3) strengthen descriptions of self by Latina feminists with the aid of Heideggerian phenomenology, and (4) take Heideggerian phenomenology beyond Heidegger's own description. This essay provides suggestions regarding (1)-(3); a discussion of (4) is beyond its scope. I intend to carry out this latter discussion in another piece.

8. In the following I use the words "subject" and "subjectivity" as referring to the epistemic, substantial account of persons, such as the Cartesian subject. When referring to an alternative conception of persons, one that is not based primarily on the human being's rationality or in its substantiality, I use "self." The reason for using these terms in this manner is that, given the philosophical tradition, the word "subject" is loaded with connotations of the epistemic, substantial account. In fact, this is the reason why Heidegger himself prefers to use another word to refer to human beings (Dasein). However, I leave open the possibility that a self can be considered a subject if "subject" is not exclusively tied to the epistemic, substantial view. In fact, some of the commentators that I refer to in this essay, such as Sandoval (1995) and Norma Alarcón (1997), use the words "subject" and "self" interchangeably.

9.Writers and theorists question the notion of the subject to various degrees. Their discussions range from a problematization of the relationship between the subject as author and the text to disappearing subjects or dead subjects and selves. Recently, there have been various discussions about the "death" of the subject and about its replacement by Dasein. See Eduardo Cadava (1991) and Simon Critchley and Peter Dews (1996).

10. This idea of a self in the making has also been proposed by other feminists. See Ann Ferguson (1988, 339-56) for an account of the self as an "existential process." See Susan Hekman (1995, 194) for an account of a "discursive subject" and a criticism of "dialectical accounts of subjectivity." Also, see Rosi Braidotti (1994, 5), which discusses a critical consciousness (the nomadic subject) that "resists settling into socially coded modes of thought and behavior." I am still not sure how this latter account of "nomadic subjectivity" relates to an account of self such as Gloria Anzaldúa's. There are some similarities. However, Braidotti claims that her account is a "figuration for the kind of subject who has relinquished all idea, desire, or nostalgia for fixity" (Braidotti 1994, 22), whereas Anzaldúa sometimes still holds on to this nostalgia when she refers to her "total Self" (Anzaldúa 1987, 83) or when she states, "And suddenly I feel everything rushing to a center, a nucleus. All the lost pieces of myself come flying from the deserts and the mountains and the valleys, magnetized toward that center. Completa" (1987, 51). And yet, Braidotti herself goes on to claim that the nomadic subject is still a unity--"her/his mode is one of definite, seasonal patterns of movements through rather fixed routes" (1994, 22). For an informative discussion of various feminist perspectives on the self, see Diana Tietjens Meyers (1999).

11. As is well known, this Heideggerian account of the self in the making (which itself was inspired by Max Scheler) was very influential and inspired many thinkers, most notably Sartre. One of the most interesting accounts of this idea of the self in the making, which was inspired by phenomenology, is that of the Argentinean philosopher Risieri Frondizi in his text The Nature of the Self (1953), which discusses the idea of the self as a Gestalt (129-47), as a structural unit that is active but also has permanence, and which provides arguments against both the Lockean account of personal identity and the Humean claim that human beings are merely bundles of impressions.

12. To understand how this phenomenological self is really an active self (even though it might be thought of as passive due to the fact that it is sometimes completely dominated by social norms), it is necessary to understand the Heideggerian view of "projection." It has to do with the fact that we are always projecting ourselves towards future possibilities. This is something we do in virtue of the fact that we are human beings that exist and, as such, always have to choose some possibilities over others (Heidegger 1962, 185).

13. Heidegger rejects theories of empathy, or theories that try to bridge the gap between one and the "other," because these theories have already started with the wrong assumption: that there is a gap in the first place. Instead, Heidegger claims that Mitsein or being-with is already an ontological characteristic of human beings; that is, given its ontological status, Dasein already has the possibility of understanding others (1962, 149). Of course, depending on different ontical circumstances, this understanding may be obscured or there might even be misunderstandings.

14. According to Heidegger, human beings are in the world and "know" the world by way of "know-how," a non-reflective understanding. Thus, we orient ourselves primarily in this mode--for example, when opening doors, we don't think "handle," "handles are for opening the door," "grab handle and turn it"; we just open the door and come in the room. Heidegger also offers an account of knowledge as "knowing-that," or thematic, reflective knowledge, but this latter account is dependent on being-in-the-world as "know-how."

15. See Heidegger (1962, chap. 4, sec. 27) for a full explanation of the "ways of being" of das Man or what Heidegger refers to as "publicness."

16. Here I am emphasizing the "positive" aspect of das Man, the fact that it serves as a guide for our everyday dealings in the world. However, as we will see later, Heidegger also writes about the negative characteristics of this mode of being, namely that it can dominate human beings to such an extent that they lose responsibility for their actions. Consequently, Heidegger's discussion of Dasein includes not only an explanation of its everyday mode (the mode under das Man) but also an explanation of "resolute" or authentic existence (1962, div. 2). For more on the different interpretations of das Man, see Hubert Dreyfus (1991) and Frederick Olafson (1994).

17. The following discussion is based on various sections of Being and Time (1962), but primarily on chapter 5, in which Heidegger discusses the way in which human beings are able to disclose a "world" (through the existential characteristics of Befindlichkeit, Understanding, and Discourse). The sections 32-34 are particularly important for an understanding of what I am calling the hermeneutic character of Dasein. For a clear and helpful discussion of this issue see also David Hoy (1993).

18. The following explanation of the historicality of Dasein is based on Being and Time (Heidegger 1962, div. 2, chap. 5).

19. For a fascinating account of the temporality of human beings see Being and Time (1962, div. 2, chap. 3-6), especially chapter 3, in which Heidegger describes temporality as the most important existential characteristic of human beings.

20. For a discussion on "heritage," "fate," and "destiny," concepts that relate to the idea of a shared history, a history of "my people," see Being and Time (1962, chap. 5, sec. 74). Here Heidegger discusses the historicizing of the community, our living life, with possibilities that we have inherited. One point of interest in this discussion is that, according to Heidegger, possibilities are handed down to us by the history of our community; yet, we can also reinterpret them given the hermeneutic nature of our existences. Unfortunately, some of these concepts, especially "destiny," coupled with the idea of authenticity, have been taken to lead to a defense of totalitarian systems, as was the case with Heidegger's defense of National Socialism in 1933. In my reading of the "Existential Analytic," I do not think that these concepts necessarily lead to the defense of such systems, but this does not mean that Heidegger didn't use them in order to support his personal biases (I do not want to try to defend Heidegger for his terrible decisions/actions). But I do think that these concepts coupled with the Heideggerian account of Mitsein may also lead to more positive systems. However, a full or in-depth analysis of this important issue is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion on Heidegger and the political question see Richard Wolin (1993) and Hugo Ott (1993).

21. Heidegger explains this in Being and Time (1962, chap. 2 and 3). Further, he connects non-reflective understanding of the world to our use of things that are "ready-to-hand" for us, or things that we use as equipment and that are part of an equipmental whole.

22. Here I am taking the liberty of describing the experience of being at ease as being similar to the experience of being under the mode of das Man, given that both have to do with the level of comfort that one has in one's everyday dealings in a "world." I recognize, however, that there are important differences, especially if we think of the different aims of both projects.

23. Even though Heidegger claims that his account of das Man is not normative (1962, sec. 27), his harsh language when describing Dasein's dominion by das Man as well as his claim that Dasein has to modify das Man in order to reach an authenticity clearly indicate his distaste of das Man's dominion over everyday existence. Yet, as pointed out above, he also thinks that das Man is a positive phenomenon since we are social beings.

24. It is important to note here that I do not mean to say that all Nicaraguans or all white U.S.-Americans would react in the same way to a particular situation; I do not wish to essentialize group identity. I wish to emphasize the fact that we might react differently depending on our backgrounds and familiarity with the dominant norms and practices.

25. Although Lugones's view of "world" is similar to the Heideggerian account in the sense that "world" is not supposed to refer to the sum or aggregate of objects in the world but includes ontological elements, there is an important difference. Heidegger sees himself as providing a systematic account of "existentialia" (1962, 70) or existential characteristics of human beings (being-in-the-world, das Man, Mitsein, Befindlichkeit, Understanding, Discourse, etc.). Lugones, on the other hand, is concerned with bringing to light the lives of those who are not in the mainstream and who "travel" worlds as a matter of survival and showing how their experiences might enrich dominant groups. She does not set out to provide an "Existential Analytic" as Heidegger does.

26. This ambiguity, according to Lugones, is "survival-rich," as it allows "world"-travelers to have a better understanding of the dominant group and themselves. For example, Lugones says that as a Latina she can be the Latina that Anglos expect her to be (the intense Latina) or who she is (which in her case also involves being intense); she can animate the stereotype or "the real thing" (1989, 285). I see Lugones's point here, because animating the stereotype might allow us to survive and to take advantage of the opportunities that are out there for Latinos (constructed in the stereotypical way). However, I do not understand why Lugones uses the expression "the real thing," and I do not think that animating our stereotypes is always helpful.

27. Here I have to add that Lugones's example is very significant to me, as well as to other Latin Americans I know, since we constantly feel that we are not very playful in a predominantly white world.

28. Paradoxically, she also writes about a "Self" or a "total Self" (Anzaldúa 1987, 20, 39, 70) and a "center" or "nucleus" (1987, 51).

29. I am basing my analysis on what Lugones states in "Playfulness, 'World'-traveling, and Loving Perception" (1989). In a later piece, however, Lugones ties the notion of the new mestiza to what she calls the "logic of curdling," the logic of a being that is multiple but is not fragmented and that has the possibility of resistance (1996, 27-29). I am more sympathetic to this characterization of a multiple being; yet, some familiar questions regarding this being's selfhood, identity, and agency remain to be answered.

30. For useful discussions on the problem of personal identity and classical responses to Locke's account, see John Perry (1975).

31. Admittedly, Lugones's aim is not to provide a full account of selfhood, but to open up the possibility of a "pluralistic feminism" by introducing the important notion of "world"-traveling and to bring to light the notion of the "arrogant perception" of women of color by white U.S.-American feminists (1989). Thus, she does not discuss all the issues related to selfhood in detail. However, I think that her account needs to deal with these issues given her characterization of the "world"-traveler.

32. Some might object to this appeal to "togetherness" or "continuity." However, the view that I am offering here is not intended to be that of a unified subject in the traditional sense; it is not an appeal to an ego point or transcendental ego which has the task of unifying experience. The view that I am proposing here recognizes the importance of one's relationship with others. Given the multiplicitous nature of a "world"-traveler, encounters with others might lead to revisions or reinterpretations of his or her self-understanding. In fact, the very experience of "world"-traveling involves encounters with others that embody a different "world." Meeting these people is, in my view, crucial to the development of what has above been explained as mestiza consciousness. See Ofelia Schutte's discussion (1998) of the possibility of North-South cross-cultural communication in which she uses existential phenomenology as well as postcolonial theory to criticize the notion of a "unified subject" and to bring to light the importance of the relationship with the "other" in an account of self.

33. For example, in The Nature of the Self (1953), Frondizi explains the self as a structural unity, a self that is not a substance, that does not have a transcendental ego, that is defined by its activity in the world but that nevertheless is not merely a bundle of activities but a unity.

34. There are also other projects being carried out which use Heideggerian phenomenology (although not in an explicit way) in the context of feminist accounts of self. For example, see Victoria Burke (2000), in which she describes the feminist self as a site of a fundamental contradiction. She also describes this self as having a world that has a totality of reference relations or involvements, a Heideggerian view.

35. For a more in-depth account of this issue (in the context of recent interpretations of Heidegger), see Mariana Ortega (2000).

36. I would provide a similar response to those who might object that my view runs into the same problems about memory that I claim Lugones's account has. That is, I would respond that, given my position of a multiplicitous self that has an ontological dimension, we cannot isolate just one element. I do not assign memory as crucial a role in my account as Lugones seems to and as Locke definitely does.

37. I think that the framework of the account of the multiplicitous self that I provide here may also be used for an account of self in general or a monocultural self, given that even a monocultural self has ambiguities and contradictions. I do not think that an account of self that does justice to experience could describe human beings as perfectly homogeneous and unified selves.

38. An in-depth analysis of issues regarding agency and responsibility is beyond the scope of this essay. Yet, I think that it is important to raise the issue and make a suggestion as to why the account suggested here might be in a better position to deal with such questions.

39. Accounts that leave us with our hands tied are accounts that do not yield the possibility of agency or responsibility or attribution of rights. Different accounts might fall under this category in different degrees.

40. For more on the state of "intimate terrorism," see Anzaldúa (1987, 20) and Lugones (1992, 32).

41. For more on the Coatlicue state, see Anzaldúa (1987, chap. 4) and Lugones (1992, 32). In this latter piece, Lugones explains how Anzaldúa's work opens up a theoretical space for resistance. She makes an interesting distinction between the notions of a "dual" personality (a hyphenated personality which is the creation of the Anglos, which does not allow for hybridity) and a "plural" personality (the personality which includes hybridity) and claims that this "plural" personality is the personality of Anzaldúa's new mestiza (1992, 35). She states that "this plural personality of the new mestiza is anchored in the borders, in that space where critique, rupture and hybridization take place" (1992, 35). Lugones explains Anzaldúa's interesting idea that the new mestizas are beings that are neither Mexican nor Anglo but both. As Anzaldúa says, "Being Mexican is a state of soul--not one of mind, not one of citizenship. Neither eagle nor serpent, but both. And like the ocean, neither animal respects borders" (1987, 62). Linda Alcoff, however, is worried that this view of the New Mestiza as a border crosser may also be used to further oppress "world"-travelers. She gives examples of la Malinche, Cortés's interpreter, who made it possible for Cortés to communicate with Montezuma and subsequently to trick him (1995, 276). Thus, while she sees the positive characteristics of Anzaldúa's characterization of the new mestiza, she worries about the problems it may give rise to.

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"New Mestizas," "'World'-Travelers," and "Dasein": Phenomenology and the Multi-Voiced, Multi-Cultural Self

Mariana Ortega

I. The "World"-Traveler Self

II. The Self as Being-in-the-World

IV. "World"-Traveling and the Multiplicitous Self

V. The Multiplicitous Self

Conclusion: What "World"-Travelers See in the Distance

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"New Mestizas," "'World'-Travelers," and "Dasein": Phenomenology and the Multi-Voiced, Multi-Cultural Self

Mariana Ortega

I. The "World"-Traveler Self

II. The Self as Being-in-the-World

IV. "World"-Traveling and the Multiplicitous Self

V. The Multiplicitous Self

Conclusion: What "World"-Travelers See in the Distance

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